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AFFIRMING FIRM SANCTIONS:  
THE AUTHORITY TO SANCTION LAW FIRMS 
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
Vincent J. Margiotta* 
 
A circuit split exists as to whether 28 U.S.C. § 1927 allows for an award 
of sanctions against nonattorneys or nonrepresentatives.  Five federal courts 
of appeals—the Second, Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and the District of 
Columbia Circuits—hold that, to further the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
courts have the authority to sanction a law firm for the conduct of its 
attorneys, in addition to the authority to sanction individual officers of the 
court.  The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits disagree, concluding that the 
statute allows federal courts to sanction only individuals—“attorney[s] or 
other person[s] admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States.” 
In In re MJS Las Croabas Properties, Inc., the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel of the First Circuit recently recognized this split of authority.  The 
appellate panel discussed the text of § 1927 as well as policy considerations 
supporting its applicability to law firms.  Although the panel noted that the 
statute does not expressly provide for vicarious liability, it nonetheless 
concluded that § 1927 implicitly allows for the imposition of sanctions 
against a law firm. 
This Note analyzes federal courts’ interpretations of § 1927 and argues 
that law firms ought to be within reach of the statute. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a plaintiff brings an action against several defendants:  an 
apartment complex and its manager, the general property manager of the 
complex, and the company that owns the building.  The plaintiff alleges that 
she was harassed by the apartment manager and ultimately evicted when she 
rejected the apartment manager’s advances.  In the complaint, the plaintiff’s 
attorney certifies that she conducted interviews with many former tenants 
who were victims of similar treatment by the defendants. 
The plaintiff’s attorney fails to answer the defendants’ interrogatories and 
document requests, fails to comply with deposition notices, and withholds 
disclosure of the names and addresses of witnesses the plaintiff expects to 
call at trial.  The defendants then move for summary judgment, and the 
plaintiff’s attorney does not respond to the motion. 
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More than twelve months pass and the plaintiff’s counsel finally commits 
to several of the defendants’ requested witness depositions.  None of the 
witnesses deposed—all of whom were mentioned in the plaintiff’s complaint 
and whose accounts were certified by the plaintiff’s attorney—corroborate 
the plaintiff’s allegations.  The plaintiff then voluntarily moves to dismiss the 
action.  At this point, the defendants have accrued over $100,000 in 
attorneys’ fees and litigation costs due to the plaintiff’s counsel’s delay, 
unreasonable litigation conduct, and bad faith. 
The district court grants the motion and invites the defendants to move for 
sanctions.  The defendants do so pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927,1 which allows 
a court to award attorneys’ fees and costs for opposing counsel’s 
unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings.  The plaintiff’s 
counsel opposes the motion and files its own, alleging new arguments and 
submitting new affidavits to support the plaintiff’s previously dismissed 
claims.  This motion is opposed by the defendants and four months later the 
court denies the plaintiff’s motion. 
Soon after, the district court grants the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ 
fees and costs and imposes $107,845.77 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s 
attorney and her law firm, holding them jointly and severally liable for the 
award.  The plaintiff’s attorney’s law firm appeals the decision of the district 
court. 
The circuit court upholds the sanctions imposed against the attorney but 
reverses the lower court’s imposition of sanctions against the law firm, 
notwithstanding the following findings:  (1) there is a close connection 
between the plaintiff’s attorney’s actions and those of her firm, (2) every 
paper the plaintiff’s attorney filed also bears the name of her law firm, (3) the 
law firm was on notice that its attorney’s litigation conduct was questionable, 
and (4) the plaintiff’s attorney’s law firm had been previously directed in a 
separate action by another judge in the same district court to monitor the 
attorney’s litigation conduct because of her unreasonable behavior in cases 
unrelated to this suit. 
Now assume that the plaintiff’s attorney cannot individually pay the 
$107,845.77 sanctions award.  The defendants cannot recoup the monies 
expended to defend against the plaintiff’s meritless claims and the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s bad faith litigation conduct.  Even though the plaintiff’s attorney’s 
law firm might have endorsed—or even encouraged—its attorney’s litigation 
practices, the defendants cannot collect the award from the firm. 
These facts (other than the assumption of the judgment-proof counsel) and 
holdings are not fiction.2  Some circuit courts hold that sanctions pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1927 may be imposed against law firms.3  Other circuits do not 
allow such impositions.4  If the above case was tried in a jurisdiction that 
allows for the imposition of sanctions against law firms under § 1927, then 
 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 2. See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 718–21 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 3. See generally infra Part II.A. 
 4. See generally infra Part II.B. 
268 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
the defendants would be able to recover costs and fees incurred fighting the 
meritless and prolonged litigation.  Thus, whether a party has adequate 
redress to collect costs and fees incurred as a result of unreasonable and 
vexatious litigation conduct turns solely on federal statutory interpretation 
within a given jurisdiction. 
This Note examines the federal circuit courts’ inconsistent interpretations 
and applications of § 1927 regarding the authority to sanction law firms.  Part 
I provides background information necessary to understand the circuit split 
at issue in this Note.  In particular, Part I sets forth the historical imposition 
of sanctions on law firms under relevant legislative and judicial guidelines.  
Part II details how different circuits approach the question of § 1927’s 
applicability.  Part III then analyzes each approach’s strengths and 
shortcomings.  It proposes a novel solution that would reconcile the split of 
authority and command interpretive uniformity. 
This Note argues that § 1927’s authority reaches law firms and entities that 
employ individuals as attorneys.5  Furthermore, this Note urges Congress to 
intervene and remedy the federal courts’ differing interpretations.  Section 
1927 should be amended to meet its initial purpose—deterring frivolous 
litigation conduct.6  This Note concludes with an appendix containing 
proposed amendments to § 1927. 
As an alternative to statutory amendment, this Note invites the federal 
judiciary to utilize its inherent authority to sanction7 in order to impose 
sanctions on law firms for unreasonable and vexatious litigation conduct of 
any attorneys under their employ.8  Such implementation would remedy the 
mischief § 1927 was meant to address since its inception.9 
I.  A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE IMPOSITION 
OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE LAW FIRM 
The ability to impose sanctions on litigants and their representatives serves 
an important judicial function.10  This authority maintains the integrity of the 
judicial system, regulates the behavior of parties and their representatives, 
and encourages good faith litigation.11  This authority also helps courts police 
bad faith conduct and preserve an orderly system of justice.12 
 
 5. Some scholarship has addressed § 1927’s application to law firms, but general 
attention to this issue has been minimal. See, e.g., GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS:  THE 
FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 21(C)(2) (5th ed. 2013); see also 1 RONALD E. MALLEN, 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 11:59 (2017 ed. 2017) (stating that “[t]he language of [§] 1927 is 
explicit, applying exclusively to an ‘attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases’” 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927)). 
 6. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 7. See infra Part I.C. 
 8. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 9. See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Douglas R. Richmond, Sanctioning Clients for Lawyers’ Misconduct—Problems 
of Agency and Equity, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 835, 835–36. 
 11. See generally JOSEPH, supra note 5. 
 12. Id. 
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Federal courts are granted power to impose sanctions pursuant to several 
authorities, including 28 U.S.C. § 1927.13  This statute provides courts with 
authority to sanction “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct 
cases in any court”14 for certain behavior.  The text and applicability of this 
statute have been construed and examined by multiple circuit courts to 
determine, among other things,15 whether the language of the statutory 
scheme allows for sanctions against law firms.16  The statute does not 
explicitly mention an authority to sanction firms, and courts have interpreted 
this issue in different ways.17  Some circuits have answered this inquiry in 
the affirmative,18 while others have disagreed, declining to impose sanctions 
against firms in light of § 1927’s text.19 
Whether law firms—in addition to individual attorneys or 
representatives—may be sanctioned under § 1927 is a significant legal 
concern.  The modern legal landscape is characterized by exponential law 
firm growth,20 diminished opportunities for attorney upward mobility,21 and 
 
 13. The statute, titled “Counsel’s liability for excessive costs,” reads as follows: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United 
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the 
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such 
conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 14. Id. 
 15. A split of authority exists on whether § 1927 requires a showing of subjective bad 
faith. See generally James F. Holderman, Section 1927 Sanctions and the Split Among the 
Circuits, 32 LITIG. 44 (2005) (discussing varying degrees of conduct required by the circuits 
to find violation of § 1927).  This Note does not contemplate this issue.  For an interesting 
discussion of the dichotomy between objective and subjective bad faith, see generally David 
E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885 (2016). 
 16. See generally infra Part II. 
 17. See generally infra Part II.  As the Ninth Circuit aptly noted, whether law firms may 
be sanctioned under the statutory scheme “is ‘purely’ an issue of law.” Kaass Law v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
 20. See Roy Strom, After Record, More Firm Mergers Expected, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 
(Mar. 17, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Archives/2016/03/17/ 
mergers-03-17-16.aspx [https://perma.cc/X4Z9-UKJK] (stating law firm growth is needed to 
overcome generational issues currently plaguing firms at a time where large firm mergers 
already exist in record numbers); see also Jeremy Nobile, Appetite for Growth Leading to 
More Law Firm Mergers, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20160214/NEWS/160219904/appetite-for-growth-
leading-to-more-law-firm-mergers [https://perma.cc/B58E-YDAY].  Large law firm mergers 
have become a common occurrence as well. See, e.g., Christine Simmons, Arnold Porter and 
Kaye Scholer Confirm $1bn Merger Deal, LEGALWEEK (Nov. 10, 2016), 
http://www.legalweek.com/sites/legalweek/2016/11/10/arnold-porter-and-kaye-scholer-
confirm-1bn-merger-deal/?slreturn=20170706185854 [https://perma.cc/L9ED-9268]; 
Christine Simmons, Merger Madness Hits Crowell & Moring, Herrick Feinstein, N.Y. L.J. 
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202774564776/Merger-Madness-
Hits-Crowell-amp-Moring-Herrick-Feinstein?mcode=1202615704879&slreturn 
=20161115192248 [https://perma.cc/K2G2-7LAW]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Norton Rose and 
Chadbourne Complete Merger, ABA J. (June 30, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/norton_rose_and_chadbourne_complete_merger [https://perma.cc/522K-8DGR]. 
 21. Neil J. Dilloff, The Changing Cultures and Economics of Large Law Firm Practice 
and Their Impact on Legal Education, 70 MD. L. REV. 341, 347–48 (2011). 
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heightened market and competition pressures.22  In fact, both the number of 
large law firms and the number of attorneys employed by such firms have 
grown exponentially since the mid-1980s.23  These factors exemplify a 
market trend in which a growing number of small and midsized firms have 
realized that diverse geographic platforms, sufficient resources for 
investment, and adequate strength across various practice areas may be 
necessary to achieve objectives or merely to survive.24  In addition, such 
factors might have deleterious effects on the way attorneys “zealously” assert 
their clients’ positions.25  An attorney faced with the pressures discussed 
above26 might be tempted to pursue a frivolous claim or handle a client’s 
interests unprofessionally and unreasonably, thus delaying proceedings or 
multiplying them as a function of some dilatory litigation strategy.27 
The following sections discuss the origins and development of the 
imposition of sanctions against law firms pursuant to § 1927 as well as two 
other well-known sanctioning authorities:  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the federal courts’ inherent authority to sanction. 
A.  28 U.S.C. § 1927’s Legislative History, 
Scope, Nature, and Purpose 
In 1813, Congress enacted the predecessor statute to § 1927.28  The 
principal directive of the congressional committee responsible for the 
 
 22. See Jennifer Smith, Law Firms, Market Pressure and Change:  How Soon Is Now?, 
WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014, 4:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/05/14/law-firms-
market-pressure-and-change-how-soon-is-now/ [https://perma.cc/NG98-RMLM]. 
 23. See infra notes 150–58 and accompanying text.  The National Law Journal (NLJ), an 
industry affiliate, annually publishes data of the largest U.S. law firms.  No firm had more than 
500 attorneys when NLJ published in 1978 its inaugural list of the 200 largest law firms. See 
Introducing the NLJ 350, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.nationallaw 
journal.com/id=1202489565842.?id=1202489565842 [https://perma.cc/B4DF-NAUU].  
Since 2015, however, more than twenty firms employ more than 1,000 lawyers and at least 
eighty-five firms staff 500 or more attorneys. See Chart:  The 2015 NLJ 350, NAT’L L.J. (June 
8, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/home/id=1202728576002 [https://perma.cc/ 
7KLJ-7VWP]. 
 24. See, e.g., Christine Simmons, For Midsize NYC Firms, 2016 Highlighted Need to 
Merge, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202775184586/ 
For-Midsize-NYC-Firms-2016-Highlighted-Need-to-Merge [https://perma.cc/7X5E-CRR9] 
(discussing the increase in large-scale law firm mergers and current state of the legal 
landscape). 
 25. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 26. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 27. Although association with a large firm is by no means an indication that an attorney 
may be more likely to abuse the litigation process, a correlation between judicial conduct and 
employment pressure is a concern meriting attention in today’s legal landscape given the 
increasing concentration of attorneys employed by larger firms and the exponential growth of 
law firms over the past thirty years. See Introducing the NLJ 350, supra note 23 and 
accompanying text. 
 28. Act Concerning Suits and Costs in Courts of the United States, ch. 14, sec. 2, 3 Stat. 
19, 21 (1813) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 829 (1940) and amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980)).  
This statute read: 
And if any attorney, proctor, or other person admitted to manage and conduct 
causes in a court of the United States or of the territories thereof, shall appear to 
have multiplied the proceedings in any cause before the court so as to increase costs 
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statute’s construction was “to inquire what [l]egislative provision is 
necessary to prevent multiplicity of suits or processes, where a single suit or 
process might suffice.”29  The result was § 1927 in its earliest form.30 
Section 1927’s predecessor statute was reenacted in 1853 when Congress 
introduced comprehensive guidelines for costs and litigation fees in federal 
actions.31  For the 127 years that followed, the statute’s substance remained 
unchanged.32 
In 1980, § 1927 was amended as part of a congressional objective to reduce 
costs and expedite judicial processes involving antitrust litigation.33  The 
purpose of the amendment was to “broaden the range of increased expenses 
which an attorney . . . may be required by the judge to satisfy personally.”34  
This congressional activity was a direct response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,35 in which the Court held that 
§ 1927 authorized only statutory “costs”36 and not awards of attorneys’ fees 
or expenses.37  Thus, Congress amended the statute to correct the Court’s 
holding in Roadway. 
Since 1980, § 1927 has read as follows: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in 
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to 
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct.38 
The statute does not expressly state that law firms or other entities may be 
subject to sanctions for unreasonable or vexatious conduct.39  Five federal 
courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit, have upheld the imposition 
of § 1927 sanctions against law firms.40  Three circuits have declined to reach 
 
unreasonably and vexatiously, such person may be required by order of court to 
satisfy any excess of costs so incurred. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. See 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813); see also JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 20. 
 30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Act to Regulate Fees and Costs to Be Allowed Clerks, Marshals, and Attorneys 
of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 160, 162 (1853). 
 32. See JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 20; see also infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1154, 1156 
(1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96–1234, at 7 (1980) 
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2781, 2782. 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 96–1234, at 8–9 (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). 
 35. 447 U.S. 752 (1980). 
 36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012) (setting forth fees which may be taxed as costs by a judge 
or clerk of any court of the United States). 
 37. See Roadway, 447 U.S. at 757–60 (construing “costs” and concluding that attorneys’ 
fees were not contemplated by the drafters of § 1927 in light of Congress’s adoption of § 
1920). 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See generally Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012); Lee v. 
First Lenders Ins. Servs., Inc., 236 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2001); LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & 
Co., 146 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991); Baker 
Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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the same conclusion, holding that the statute’s construction and legislative 
intent bar courts from imposing sanctions on law firms.41 
B.  Rule 11 and Authority by Amendment to Sanction the Firm 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was first adopted in 193842 
and has been touted as the “most prominent provision authorizing sanctions 
for litigation abuse.”43  The rule bestows an affirmative duty on lawyers for 
the duration of court proceedings, requiring them to make reasonable 
inquiries into the facts of their cases to ensure valid bases of their clients’ 
claims.44  Notwithstanding its renown, the scope of Rule 11 is, in fact, fairly 
limited.45  The only behavior that may be sanctioned under the Rule is an 
attorney or representative’s signing or “later advocating” a pleading, motion, 
or other paper that has no firm ground in fact and law.46  Thus, the rule’s 
focus is on document filings—“pleading[s], written motion[s], and other 
paper[s]”47—that are unreasonable, harassing, delaying, frivolous, 
fraudulent, and the like.48 
Despite this limited scope, Rule 11 expressly permits imposition of 
sanctions against law firms.49  But this has not always been the case.50  In 
1989, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group51 to address the applicability of Rule 11 sanctions 
against a law firm and, in addition, the vicarious liability of law firms when 
sanctions are imposed against a firm’s attorney.52  The Court noted that there 
was a split of authority among the circuit courts on these two issues.53  In an 
eight-to-one decision, the Court ultimately concluded that Rule 11 sanctions 
may not be imposed on law firms.54  The majority of the Court relied heavily 
 
 41. See generally Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2015); 
FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 614 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2010); Rentz v. Dynasty 
Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 42. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1028 (1982). 
 43. JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 1. 
 44. Stephen R. Ripps & John N. Drowatzky, Federal Rule 11:  Are the Federal District 
Courts Usurping the Disciplinary Function of the Bar?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 67, 68 (1997). 
 45. Id. 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 1. 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
 48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c); see also JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 5(E)(1). 
 50. JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 5(E)(1) (“Under the 1983 version [of] Rule 11, there was no 
vicarious liability.  Liability was personal to the signer and the signer’s client.”). 
 51. 493 U.S. 120 (1989), aff’g Calloway v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
 52. See generally Pavelic, 473 U.S. 120. 
 53. Id. at 122–23.  In Calloway, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s imposition 
of sanctions on a law firm pursuant to Rule 11, in “square disagreement” with the Fifth Circuit, 
which held in Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1128–30 (5th Cir. 
1987), that Rule 11 authorizes sanctions only against individual lawyers who sign court papers. 
Calloway, 854 F.2d at 1479. 
 54. Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 127. 
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on the plain meaning of “person who signed”55 within the context of Rule 11 
to conclude that the Rule applies only to an individual attorney—not an entity 
or law firm—even where the signature on the document at issue is 
unambiguously made on behalf of a firm.56 
In 1993, Congress approved amendments to Rule 11,57 effectively 
reversing the Court’s decision in Pavelic by providing federal courts the 
express authority to sanction law firms pursuant to Rule 11(c).58  The 
amendments to Rule 11 further provide that, absent any exceptional 
circumstances, “a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation 
committed by its partner, associate, or employee.”59  Thus, not only does the 
current form of Rule 11 allow for sanctions against a law firm, but it 
demands, absent exceptional circumstances, vicarious liability for law firms 
for sanctions imposed against their attorneys or other employees.60 
C.  The Common Law Standard:  Inherent Authority to Sanction 
Rule 11, like § 1927 and other judicial sanction authorities, allows courts 
to impose sanctions for particular, limited conduct.61  But Rule 11 and other 
rules62 and statutes63 do not place limits on the authority of the federal 
judiciary to impose sanctions for conduct that is outside the scope of such 
rules or statutes.64  To this end, there is judicial and scholarly agreement that 
 
 55. See id. at 124 (quoting then-current Rule 11, which stated that “[i]f a [document] is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court . . . shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction” (emphasis added)). 
 56. Id. at 127. 
 57. It should be noted that Congress is not responsible for drafting additions or 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  These rules are promulgated by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, after which Congress may veto the rules 
within a certain time frame. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074(a) (2012); cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & 
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1941) (discussing how federal rules are submitted to Congress “so 
that [it] might examine them and veto their going into effect if contrary to the policy of the 
legislature”).  If Congress does not veto proposed or amended rules, they become part of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074. 
 58. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (stating that a “court may impose an appropriate sanction on any 
attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation” (emphasis 
added)). 
 59. Id. (emphasis added).  In comments accompanying the amendment, the 1993 Advisory 
Committee stated that it is appropriate for a law firm to be jointly responsible for its 
employees’ conduct under “established principles of agency.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory 
committee’s note to 1993 amendments. 
 60. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(C). 
 61. See, e.g., supra Parts I.A (discussing conduct that falls within the scope of § 1927) 
and I.B (identifying conduct that triggers sanctions under Rule 11). 
 62. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37.  Rule 37 deals primarily with attorneys’ failures to make 
requested disclosures or cooperate in discovery matters. Id.  
 63. See, e.g., supra Part I.A (discussing the scope of § 1927). 
 64. See JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 26(A)(1). 
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federal courts exhibit an inherent authority65 to exercise certain powers,66 
including the authority to sanction “abusive litigation practices.”67  This 
authority reaches individual litigants, counsel, and law firms that abuse the 
judicial process through bad faith conduct.68  The leading Supreme Court 
decision recognizing the authority of federal courts to use their inherent 
authority to impose sanctions is Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.69 
In Chambers, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a purchase agreement 
for the defendant’s facilities and television broadcast licenses.70  Under the 
purchase agreement, both parties had an obligation to file documents with the 
FCC by a certain date to obtain the agency’s approval of the deal.71  Before 
the filing deadline, the defendant changed its mind and attempted to talk the 
plaintiff out of the agreed-upon purchase, but the plaintiff refused.72  The 
defendant then told the plaintiff it would not comply with the necessary 
federal regulations.73  After this exchange, the plaintiff informed the 
defendant that it planned to commence an action for specific performance 
under the contract.74  In an attempt to place its property outside the reach of 
the federal courts, the defendant quickly deeded the property to a trust and 
subsequently alleged such transfer was a proper sale to a third party, which 
precluded the plaintiff’s suit.75  The Western District of Louisiana concluded 
that the defendant had frivolously filed documents, delayed proceedings, and 
initiated fraud upon the court.76  The court described the defendant’s conduct 
as having “emasculated and frustrated the purposes of [the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure] and the powers of [the District] Court by . . . prevent[ing the 
defendant’s] access to the remedy of specific performance.”77  After 
acknowledging that the scopes of both Rule 11 and § 1927 would not reach 
 
 65. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962) (discussing courts’ inherent 
authority, “governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”); 
see also JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 26(A)(1). 
 66. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (holding that federal courts have, 
pursuant to the nature of the judicial system, implied powers which are necessary for courts to 
exercise all other powers vested in the judiciary); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 
447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (stating that the most prominent inherent power of the federal courts 
is the authority to sanction). 
 67. JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 26(A)(1).  One scholar has framed this authority as one that 
“flows from the powers possessed by a court simply because it is a court; it is an authority that 
inheres in the very nature of a judicial body and requires no grant of power” from a 
constitution, statute, or written rule. Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the 
Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1995). 
 68. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 69. 501 U.S. 32 (1991); see also Thomas E. Baker, The Inherent Power to Impose 
Sanctions:  How a Federal Judge Is Like an 800-Pound Gorilla, 14 REV. LITIG. 195, 196–97 
(1994). 
 70. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 35–36. 
 71. Id. at 36. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 36–37. 
 76. See generally NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1372 
(W.D. La. 1985), aff’d, 797 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 77. Id. at 1383. 
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the defendant’s conduct,78 the court relied on powers inherent in its judicial 
authority to sanction the conduct at issue.79 
Although the Court acknowledges such judicial power, the type of fee-
shifting that the inherent authority to sanction endorses is generally contrary 
to the “American Rule,”80 which has deep origins in judicial history and 
legislative policy.81  Indeed, federal courts’ inherent powers, including the 
authority to sanction, “must be exercised with restraint and discretion” 
because such authority has been established outside the bounds of democratic 
controls and is, in fact, shielded from them.82  The Chambers Court reasoned 
that exceptions to the general standard may arise, therefore bestowing on 
federal courts an inherent authority to assess sanctions for vexatious, wanton, 
oppressive, or other bad faith conduct.83  Thus, the scope of federal courts’ 
inherent power to sanction has been deemed limited.84  Because the language 
of § 1927 seems to limit the scope of sanctions for unreasonable and 
vexatious behavior to individuals only, the inherent power is often expressly 
disregarded or overlooked altogether where sanctions against a firm might be 
warranted.85 
D.  The Importance of Uniform Analysis 
and Treatment of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
One major question regarding whether law firms are, or should be, 
sanctionable under § 1927 is whether the effect of a resolution of the issue is 
de minimis;86 that is, whether an authority to sanction law firms pursuant to 
 
 78. After specific performance was ordered by the district court and affirmed on appeal, 
the matter was remanded to fix an award of sanctions. See generally NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu 
Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120 (W.D. La. 1989), aff’d, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), 
aff’d, 501 U.S. 32 (1991).  The court opined that Rule 11 sanctions were not appropriate 
because evidence supporting allegations of fraudulent filings did not surface until the 
beginning of trial. Id. at 138–39.  Section 1927 sanctions were likewise inappropriate and 
“outside the reach of [the] statute” because:  (i) the plaintiffs alleged fraudulent conduct against 
the defendant, not his counsel, and (ii) the violations were not committed by an attorney but 
by the sole shareholder of the defendant. Id. at 139; see also JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 21(C)(1). 
 79. NASCO, 124 F.R.D. at 139–42. 
 80. For a detailed discussion of the American Rule on fee-shifting in litigation, see 
generally John F. Vargo’s article written for the 1993 Symposium on Civil Justice Reform. 
John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:  The Injured Person’s Access 
to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993). 
 81. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (stating 
that normally a winning litigant is not entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees from the opposing 
party). 
 82. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991); see also Roadway Express, 
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). 
 83. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46. 
 84. This limitation is congruent with the Court’s holding in Roadway Express, 447 U.S. 
at 752.  In Roadway, the Court reasoned that federal courts may access attorneys’ fees and 
costs “in narrowly defined circumstances” constituting bad faith. Id. at 765. 
 85. See, e.g., Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 2005) (disallowing 
sanctions against a law firm under both § 1927 and inherent powers due to the textual 
limitations of the former and the defendants’ failure to mention the latter, even though 
recognition by a party of such authority is not required). 
 86. Cf. Baker, supra note 69, at 200 (“Presumably, any sanction contemplated under 
federal statutes and rules can be imposed incident to the inherent power as well.”). 
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§ 1927 is even necessary.  After all, federal courts have an inherent 
authority87 to sanction persons88 involved in litigation, regardless of whether 
that person is a litigant, attorney, or law firm.89  The Court has stated that the 
judiciary’s inherent powers must be utilized sparingly90 and only when bad 
faith conduct predicates the imposition of sanctions.91  Thus, the inherent 
authority to sanction particular conduct that is not subject to rule or statute is 
quite narrow.92 
In Chambers, the Court further illustrated the reach of the inherent 
sanctions power when the behavior at issue is contemplated by rule or 
statute.93  Under such circumstances, courts ordinarily should rely on the 
rules or statutes rather than the inherent authority;94 when the legislature has 
spoken, judges should adhere to Congress’s approved standards.95  Where 
“neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, [a] court may safely rely 
on its inherent power.”96 
The above example illustrates why § 1927 is an important statutory tool 
and why uniform treatment is warranted.  Because § 1927 sanctions must be 
predicated on unreasonable or vexatious conduct,97 any bad faith conduct that 
would provoke the statute’s application would presumably also warrant the 
imposition of sanctions under the courts’ inherent authority.98  To date, 
however, no court in any of the circuits that refuse to uphold or impose 
sanctions against law firms under § 1927 has utilized the inherent authority 
to sanction firms that were wholly, or even partially, responsible for bad faith 
conduct.99  Thus, courts in these circuits are hesitant to invoke the inherent 
authority to sanction law firms in lieu of express statutory authority.100 
 
 87. See supra Part I.C. 
 88. “Persons” in this context, being a term of art, includes litigants, counsel, and law firms. 
See Roadway, 447 U.S. at 752; see also Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that using their inherent authority, courts “may assess attorney’s fees against litigants, 
counsel, and law firms who willfully abuse [the] judicial process by conduct tantamount to 
bad faith”). 
 89. See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 32.  
 90. See Roadway, 447 U.S. at 764; see also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 
U.S. 418, 450–51 (1911) (stating that federal inherent authorities come with an implied 
warning that they may never be implemented where neither proper nor necessary). 
 91. Cf. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (stating that “whereas . . . other mechanisms reach[] 
only certain individuals or conduct, the inherent power extends to a full range of litigation 
abuses”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 50. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Leading Cases, Courts’ Inherent Authority to Sanction in Diversity Cases:  
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 105 HARV. L. REV. 349, 356 (1991). 
 96. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. 
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 98. See generally supra Part I.C. 
 99. See generally infra Part II.B. 
 100. See Leading Cases, supra note 95, at 350; see also infra Part II.B. 
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The application of federal statutes within the federal judicial system should 
promote convenience and uniformity.101  It is rarely efficient for federal 
courts to maintain differing views of federal legislation that may lead to 
diverse results.102  When contrary outcomes under federal law are principally 
due to jurisdictional boundaries and geographical locations, such inefficiency 
becomes even more evident.103  Section 1927 should be analyzed and applied 
consistently to promote the primary goal of uniformity within our federal 
judicial structure.104  This has not occurred under current judicial 
interpretations of § 1927.105  As this Note demonstrates, a remedy must be 
implemented for these reasons. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  AUTHORITY TO SANCTION 
LAW FIRMS PURSUANT TO § 1927 
The federal circuit courts are split as to whether sanctions against law firms 
are permitted under § 1927.106  Part II.A examines the policy justifications 
and cases that support sanctioning firms pursuant to this statutory scheme.  
Part II.B then analyzes the contradictory views. 
A.  The Majority View:  Law Firms Are Sanctionable 
Part II.A.1 discusses the majority courts’ reliance on the purposivist 
method of statutory interpretation in its analysis of § 1927.  Then, Part II.A.2 
sets forth the majority courts’ dependence on implicit authority under § 1927 
to conclude that law firms may be sanctioned under the statutory scheme.  
Part II.A.3 introduces the policies that the majority has considered in 
authorizing and affirming sanctions under § 1927 against law firms. 
1.  The Purposivist Nature of the Majority Approach 
The federal judiciary’s purposivist107 approach to statutory interpretation 
was first annunciated by the Court in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States.108  This approach dictates that courts should construe statutory 
 
 101. See Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56 
LOY. L. REV. 535, 540–44 (2010).  See generally Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008). 
 102. See Dragich, supra note 101, at 540–44. 
 103. See id. at 536. 
 104. See, e.g., COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND 
INTERNAL PROCEDURES:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 3 (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 
195, 206–07 (1975). 
 105. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 106. See generally supra Part I.A. 
 107. This Note focuses on the purposivist approach, as it has dominated the analyses of 
courts that construe § 1927 to provide for sanctions against law firms.  This Note does not 
contend that the purposivist approach supersedes any other doctrines of statutory interpretation 
and acknowledges that numerous alternative approaches exist. See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, 
Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal 
Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37 (1997).  
 108. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).   
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language to meet the purposes that Congress intended statutes to achieve.109  
Under the purposivist doctrine, courts should give heightened attention to the 
overall purpose underlying a legal enactment where the “letter”—or text—
might otherwise preclude further consideration.110 
Some courts utilize the principles of the purposivist approach and embrace 
a view that sanctions under § 1927 may be assessed upon law firms, thus 
concluding that the legislative text reaches past the conduct of individual 
attorneys and representatives.111  In Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co.,112 the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that law firms may be sanctioned under § 1927 
because “th[e] statute was designed to curb exactly the kinds of abuses that 
[the law firm, as counsel] committed in [the] case.”113  The court noted that 
the uncontested principal purpose of § 1927—“the deterrence of intentional 
and unnecessary delay in the proceedings”114—was met by its imposition of 
sanctions against a firm.115 
In another case, the Southern District of New York concluded that the 
statute’s reference to an attorney “or other person admitted to conduct cases” 
highlights the legislature’s focus on regulating entities who “conduct 
cases.”116  The court concluded that both attorneys and law firms “naturally 
fall” into this class.117  In addition, the court found that “personally”118 
satisfying excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees is best construed as 
targeting attorney-like conduct, as opposed to actions of a client or party.119  
Thus, the phrase “personally,” as used in § 1927, is appropriately understood 
not to preclude the imposition of sanctions on law firms but to preclude their 
imposition on clients and other represented parties.120 
2.  An Implicit Grant of Authority to Sanction Firms 
In addition to various courts’ analyses of congressional intent under the 
purposivist approach, some courts that have imposed sanctions against law 
firms under § 1927 have recognized an implicit grant of authority within the 
statute to impose such sanctions.121  Recently, the First Circuit’s Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel stated that “courts implicitly have upheld the practice” of 
 
 109. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113. 
 110. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 461. 
 111. See, e.g., LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 906–07 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582–83 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 112. 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 113. Id. at 1544. 
 114. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1177 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 115. Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1544, 1546. 
 116. Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
 119. Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 101. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs. Inc., 236 F.3d 443, 445–46 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., 855 F.2d 1009, 1020 (2d Cir. 1988); Baker Indus., Inc. 
v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 211–12 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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imposing sanctions on law firms under § 1927 “where appropriate.”122  In 
addition, a district court judge in the Southern District of New York 
concluded that § 1927 does not “disfavor requiring a law firm . . . to ‘satisfy 
personally’” fees and costs, so long as the firm’s conduct meets the statutory 
behavioral requirements.123  Thus, the basis for this implicit authority is fairly 
straightforward:  section 1927 affords the federal courts authority to sanction 
law firms because courts already have the authority to do so.124  Furthermore, 
because of this implicit authority, courts may utilize statutory requirements 
(in this case, the elements of § 1927) as a basis to sanction law firm 
conduct.125 
For example, in Avirgan v. Hull,126 the plaintiffs’ attorney attached an 
affidavit to an amended complaint that included alleged testimony of 
seventy-nine unnamed individuals.127  The plaintiffs’ counsel withheld the 
alleged witnesses’ identities until the district court ordered disclosure and 
after all appeals of the order were exhausted.128  This practice, “the impetus 
for . . . two years of discovery,”129 yielded a finding that no alleged witnesses 
had any credible testimony, and, even more strikingly, that approximately 
twenty of the alleged witnesses’ identities and accounts of the controversy 
were fabricated by the attorney.130  The district court sanctioned both lead 
counsel and his law firm under § 1927 for their bad faith conduct, reminding 
the bar that “[a] court may assess attorney’s fees against litigants, counsel, 
and law firms who willfully abuse judicial process by conduct tantamount to 
bad faith.”131 
Thus, some courts have constructed an implicit authority under § 1927 to 
sanction firms from the overlapping nature of legislative and judicial 
authorities.132  In Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp.,133 the Second Circuit 
affirmed a lower court’s imposition of sanctions under § 1927 against a law 
firm for the vexatious multiplication of proceedings.134  The court concluded 
 
 122. Castellanos Grp. Law Firm, L.L.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re MJS Las Croabas 
Props., Inc.), 545 B.R. 401, 420 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).  In Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of 
Florida, 193 F. App’x 833 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit upheld an award of sanctions 
against a law firm, for which at least one reason being that in a prior decision the circuit 
“implicitly determined that § 1927 applies to law firms,” id. at 838. 
 123. Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 102 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 127. Id. at 1581. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1582. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.; see also Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 132. Section 1927, Rule 11, and the courts’ inherent power often overlap in scope and 
sanctionable conduct. See Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On—Federal Civil Rights 
Plaintiffs Beware:  Rule 11 Vis-à-Vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Power, 37 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 653 (2004).  For example, Rule 11, § 1927, and the inherent power all 
might apply where a filed opposition in response to a motion is completely baseless in law or 
fact and without merit. Id.  
 133. 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 134. Id. at 147–49. 
280 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
that law firms are, by implication, sanctionable under the statute.135  Yet, 
while describing the difference between the legislation and the courts’ 
inherent authority to sanction, the circuit panel proclaimed: 
the only meaningful difference between an award made under § 1927 and 
one made pursuant to the court’s inherent power is . . . that awards under 
§ 1927 are made only against attorneys or other persons authorized to 
practice before the courts while an award made under the court’s inherent 
power may be made against an attorney, a party, or both.136 
This result is curious.  The appellate panel explicitly stated that § 1927 
sanctions may be imposed “only against attorneys or other persons,” but 
nonetheless upheld sanctions against the defendant’s counsel’s law firm 
pursuant to § 1927.137  Attempting to overcome this inconsistency, the 
Enmon court found “no serious dispute” as to whether the judiciary may 
impose sanctions on law firms under its inherent power, and that, for 
consistency’s sake, the same rule and logic should apply to its interpretation 
of § 1927.138 
3.  Public Policy Dictates Authority to Sanction the Firm 
It is well understood that § 1927 exists to remedy a certain mischief.139  
After all, the statute describes unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of 
proceedings as the basis for imposing sanctions.140  The majority courts141 
have contended that, because Congress has decreed it provident to hold 
individual attorneys or representatives authorized to conduct cases in court 
liable for these negative behaviors, those victimized by such mischief must 
have the ability to obtain costs and fees associated for any defense against 
that misconduct.142  Victims are more likely to gain compensation when 
sanctions are imposed against a large law firm rather than an individual 
person. 
Additionally, the majority circuits have also relied on the past practices of 
district courts in their respective circuits in holding that, as a matter of policy, 
law firms should be subject to sanctions under § 1927.143  The pinnacle of 
this argument is judicial acquiescence.  Circuit courts would “upset a 
relatively long-standing practice among district courts [in their respective 
circuits] if [they] were to hold that law firms may not be sanctioned under 
[the statute] for the acts of certain attorneys.”144 
 
 135. See generally id. 
 136. Id. at 144 (alteration in original) (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 
(2d Cir. 1986)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 147. 
 139. Before the legislative enactment of what would become § 1927, the Senate formed a 
committee to “inquire what [l]egislative provision is necessary to prevent multiplicity of suits 
or processes, where a single suit or process might suffice.” 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813). 
 140. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 141. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 142. See generally supra Part II.A. 
 143. See, e.g., Enmon, 675 F.3d at 147–48. 
 144. Id. at 147.  
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Yet another policy justification that has effectuated the majority circuits’ 
determination on this issue is the approval of the practice by sister circuits.145  
In Enmon, the Eleventh Circuit bolstered its decision to uphold sanctions on 
a law firm under the statute by referencing other circuits’ determinations on 
the same issue.146  In In re MJS Las Croabas Properties, Inc.,147 the First 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel did just the same.148 
The changing nature of the legal landscape also lends some policy support 
to the majority view.149  When § 1927 was enacted in its original form in 
1813,150 lawyers predominantly were solo practitioners.151  By 1980—the 
last time the statute was amended—190,188 attorneys were affiliated with or 
employed by law firms152 and the total number of firms reached 38,482.153  
By 2000, the national attorney population nearly doubled to 1.02 million.154  
And, by 2005, law firms across the United States numbered 47,562155 while 
the total percentage of lawyers associated with law firms reached 
approximately 51 percent, an increase of 16 percent over twenty years.156  In 
addition and as stated above, large law firms have grown even larger since 
the mid-1980s, in both size and number.157  But while the total number of 
firms and the percentage of practitioners associated with them have increased 
annually, the growth of the national lawyer population has flattened since 
2000.158  Thus, today more lawyers are affiliating with firms while firms 
themselves are growing in size.159 
These data portray a legal field in which a majority of attorneys practice 
under the umbrellas of firms, a phenomenon that the drafters of § 1927 simply 
could not have envisioned nor accounted for when the statute was enacted.160  
 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 148; see also Smith v. Grand Bank & Tr. of Fla., 193 F. App’x 833, 
838 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 146. See Enmon, 675 F.3d at 148 (referencing decisions of the Third, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits). 
 147. 545 B.R. 401 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
 148. Id. at 419–21. 
 149. See infra notes 150–60 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra Part I.A; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 151. See JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 21(C)(2). 
 152. See BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT:  A STATISTICAL 
PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S 29 (1985).  Data compiled by the 
American Bar Foundation indicate that there were 542,205 lawyers admitted to practice in the 
United States in 1980. Id. at 4.  That same year, roughly 35 percent of all practitioners were 
affiliated with a law firm. See id. at 29. 
 153. See Lawyer Demographics, AM. BAR ASS’N (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2013.aut
hcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC8R-YX5G]. 
 154. See Wood R. Foster, Jr., Jobs in the Law:  A Profession Hits “Pause,” BENCH & BAR 
OF MINN. (June 3, 2016), http://www.mnbenchbar.com/2016/06/jobs/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6FVB-WYGX]. 
 155. See Lawyer Demographics, supra note 153. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Foster, supra note 154.  From 2001 to 2015, the number of attorneys in the United 
States grew from roughly 1.05 million to 1.3 million, an annual increase of about 1.4 percent. 
Id.   
 159. See supra notes 152–58 and accompanying text.   
 160. See JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 21(C)(2); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
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Thus, as the majority of circuits argue, the reach of § 1927 seemingly should 
not be interpreted to prevent its application to law firms because direct or 
vicarious liability of firms could not have been analyzed appropriately in the 
19th century.  This was not an issue that warranted attention in or before 
1980.161 
B.  The Statutory Scheme Provides Authority to Sanction 
Only Attorneys and Representatives 
This section discusses the counteranalyses and arguments of the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  These minority circuits reject the imposition of 
sanctions against law firms based on § 1927’s text, legislative history, and 
Congress’s lack of subsequent legislative action.  In addition, the minority 
circuits are unpersuaded by the majority circuits’ arguments. 
1. The Minority Approach:  
It All Comes Down to the Text 
Arguments in favor of the minority coalition’s162 approach are based 
heavily on § 1927’s construction and presumed legislative intent.  In Rentz v. 
Dynasty Apparel Industries, Inc.,163 the Sixth Circuit focused on the language 
of the statutory scheme to conclude that its text fails to authorize sanctions 
against a represented party164 or a law firm.165  In doing so, the court 
compared the text of § 1927166 with that of Rule 11 as amended in 1993,167 
which expressly allows for the imposition of sanctions on law firms.168 
In BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,169 the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that, under its plain language, the statute precludes the imposition 
of sanctions against a law firm because a law firm cannot reasonably be 
considered a “person” nor can law firms be admitted to “conduct cases” in 
court.170  This interpretation conflicts with the Southern District of New 
York’s analysis of § 1927 in Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc.,171 
where the court concluded that law firms “naturally fall” into the subset of 
“person[s]” that the statute reaches.172 
 
 161. See supra notes 152–58 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits’ resistance to concluding that § 1927 reaches beyond individuals). 
 163. 556 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 164. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
 165. Rentz, 556 F.3d at 403. 
 166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (defining the scope of the statute as “[a]ny attorney or 
other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States”). 
 167. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c); see also supra Part I.B. 
 168. Rentz, 556 F.3d at 395–96; see also supra Part I.B. 
 169. 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 170. Id. at 751. 
 171. 735 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 172. Id. at 101–02; see also supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.  Brignoli’s 
reasoning has also been adopted by the First Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. See 
Castellanos Grp. Law Firm, L.L.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re MJS Croabas Props., Inc.), 
545 B.R. 401, 419–21 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
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The Seventh Circuit has taken a stance identical to that of the Sixth 
Circuit.173  As for “other person[s] admitted to conduct cases,” the Seventh 
Circuit has concluded that the statutory language covers only the conduct of 
nonattorneys admitted to practice for limited purposes, such as law students 
or those involved in patent litigation—not law firms as figurative persons.174 
In Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,175 the Ninth Circuit adopted this 
interpretation as well, citing BDT Products for its textual analysis outlined 
above.176  In the same opinion, the circuit court relied on expressio unius177 
as further support to conclude that law firms are excluded from § 1927’s 
reach.178 
Academics who have researched and written on federal sanctions law also 
favor this textual interpretation.179  For example, the American Bar 
Association has taken this position, stating that pursuant to the statute’s 
construction, § 1927 cannot reach the conduct of law firms nor hold them 
vicariously liable for attorneys’ or other representatives’ conduct or 
behavior.180 
2.  Legislative Intent and Historical Limitations 
The legislative history of § 1927 also lends support to the minority circuits’ 
analyses and has been invoked to bolster their position.181  As discussed in 
Part I.A,182 the predecessor statute to § 1927 was first enacted in 1813183 and 
allowed for the imposition of sanctions only against “any attorney, proctor, 
or other person admitted to manage and conduct [cases] in a court of the 
 
 173. See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (“No one argues that 
the . . . firm as a whole is actually ‘admitted to conduct cases’ before any court.”).  In 
Claiborne, Judge Diane P. Wood concluded that only individual attorneys could be admitted 
to practice before the courts. Id. 
 174. Id.; see also BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d at 742, 751 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
 175. 799 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 176. Id. at 1294; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 177. This canon of statutory construction, short for expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
holds that the expression or inclusion of one thing implies exclusion of the other or of the 
alternative. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 178. Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1294. 
 179. See JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 21(c)(1) (stating that, unlike Rule 11, § 1927 does not 
expressly authorize sanctions against law firms because it applies “only to ‘[a]ny attorney, or 
other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States’”); see also MALLEN, 
supra note 5, § 11:59 (“The language of [§] 1927 is explicit, applying exclusively to an 
‘attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases.’”). 
 180. See DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LITIGATION 45 
(2d ed. 2016) (“[O]nly a lawyer can be sanctioned for violating [the statute], not a party, and, 
unlike the vicarious liability that attends Rule 11, not a law firm in which the lawyer 
practices.”). 
 181. See supra Part I.A. 
 182. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 183. The statutory language was approved by the Thirteenth Congress on July 22, 1813. 
See Act Concerning Suits and Costs in Courts of the United States, ch. 14, sec. 2, 3 Stat. 19, 
21 (1813). 
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United States.”184  In 1853, when this statute was reenacted as § 1927 of Title 
28 of the U.S. Code,185 its language was not altered. 
When § 1927 was codified in the Revised Statutes of the United States, the 
language was changed minimally and law firms were not mentioned.186  The 
title of the provision, which was added as a marginal notation, reads:  
“Attorney liable for costs vexatiously increased by him.”187  Although it is 
well settled that the title of an act cannot “control plain words in the body of 
the statute,” it nonetheless may be considered to shed light on ambiguity 
therein.188  Here, even assuming that the text is ambiguous, the title suggests 
that § 1927 applies only to individual attorneys.189 
When § 1927 was amended in 1980,190 Congress altered its language by 
striking out the phrases “as to increase costs” and “such excess costs” and 
inserting “the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred 
because of such conduct.”191  The congressional record states that the 
principal reason for amending the statute was to preclude courts from 
narrowly construing its text to authorize sanctions “only in . . . egregious 
instances.”192  The amendment’s purpose, according to the drafters, was to 
expand costs that a court may impose to discourage counsel from employing 
litigation strategies that impede cases from nearing disposition.193  Moreover, 
the imposition of sanctions under § 1927 on anyone other than individual 
attorneys or representatives was never discussed during the 1979 
congressional floor debates regarding the proposed amendments.194 
In addition to the legislative history set forth above, at least one scholar 
has reasoned that the history of § 1927 is telling of its allegedly limited 
reach.195  Because law firms did not exist as common entities in 1813 when 
the original form of § 1927 was enacted,196 law firms were not included 
within the language of the statute.197  When the legislation was reenacted in 
1853,198 the text of the statute was not changed to include law firms as 
sanctionable entities because law firms were still uncommon.199  However, 
 
 184. Id.  This statute and its approval were published in the Public Statutes at Large in 
1846. Id. 
 185. See Act to Regulate Fees and Costs to be Allowed Clerks, Marshals, and Attorneys of 
the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 160, 162 (1853); see also 
supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra note 185. 
 187. See supra note 185. 
 188. See United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805). 
 189. See supra note 185. 
 190. See supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, sec. 3, 94 Stat. 1154, 1156 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)). 
 192. See 96 CONG. REC. 1347 (Feb. 8, 1979). 
 193. See id. at 1344. 
 194. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 390 (1979). 
 195. See JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 21(C)(2).  
 196. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A. 
 198. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 199. See JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 21(C)(2). 
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when the statute was last amended in 1980,200 law firms were widespread,201 
and Congress included nothing in the amendments to § 1927 to suggest a 
statutory grant of authority to impose sanctions on law firms.202 
To bolster their analyses, the minority circuits also rely on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pavelic203 to vacate sanctions imposed on a law firm 
under the pre-1993 version of Rule 11.204  Part II.B.3 below compares 
Pavelic’s seemingly analogous facts and circumstances to those associated 
with § 1927.  This Part also discusses the congressional silence surrounding 
the application of § 1927 and its support of the minority view. 
3.  Continual Congressional Silence 
Another major premise supporting the minority circuits’ approach is lack 
of congressional involvement.  In addition to the absence of foundational text 
that explicitly authorizes courts to impose sanctions on law firms under the 
statute,205 the minority courts have relied on Congress’s failure to intercede 
on the issue and amend the statute.206 
In Rentz, the Sixth Circuit noted that law firms may be sanctioned under 
Rule 11207 only because that authority has been expressly provided for in the 
federal rule.208  In doing so, the court found sanctions permissible under Rule 
11 but not under § 1927, which the court concluded did not authorize 
sanctions against law firms.209  Thus, the court reasoned that only express 
legislative permission would give the court the power to sanction a firm under 
§ 1927.210 
The Seventh Circuit has also relied on congressional silence to support its 
analysis of § 1927’s reach.  In Claiborne v. Wisdom,211 the court reversed a 
lower court’s order holding a law firm jointly and severally liable for 
sanctions imposed on the plaintiff’s attorney.212  The court referenced the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pavelic, reminding the bar that in Pavelic the 
Court concluded that “the person who signed,” as articulated in the prior 
 
 200. See supra Part I.A; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text (noting that the national law firm 
population exceeded 35,000 by 1980).  
 202. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1234, at 9 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2781, 2782 (stating that “the attorney should be required to satisfy personally 
[the] full range of excess costs attributable to” the conduct that § 1927 seeks to address 
(emphasis added)).  
 203. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 489 U.S. 1009 (1989). 
 204. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra Part II.B.1.  
 206. Congressional silence may be used to support both the majority and minority 
approaches.  However, the minority circuits have expressly relied on Congress’s silence in 
their analyses on the matter, which is why this Note categorizes congressional noninvolvement 
as a minority argument. 
 207. 556 F.3d 389, 396 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 208. See generally supra Part I.C; see also supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text.  
 209. Rentz, 556 F.3d at 395–96. 
 210. Id. at 395–403. 
 211. 414 F.3d 715 (2005). 
 212. Id. at 724. 
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version of Rule 11,213 “could only mean the individual signer, not his 
partnership, either in addition to him or in the alternative.”214  The court 
concluded that the facts and circumstances of Claiborne posed the same 
problem as Pavelic, and thus the court lacked statutory authority to sanction 
law firms under § 1927.215  The Seventh Circuit thus concluded that its hands 
were tied because Congress had not amended the statute to expressly provide 
for such authority.216 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Kaass Law that congressional silence 
precludes the applicability of § 1927 sanctions on law firms.217  In a case 
involving an allegedly erroneous credit report, the district court imposed 
sanctions for attorneys’ fees and costs against Kaass Law, the plaintiff’s 
counsel’s law firm.218  The district court noted that Kaass Law acted in bad 
faith by and through its attorney by failing to (1) properly plead under Rule 
8,219 (2) oppose Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, and (3) meet or 
communicate with Wells Fargo’s counsel, which prolonged the litigation.220  
Thus, because Kaass Law had knowledge of and failed to correct “glaring 
pleading and legal errors,”221 the law firm “recklessly and knowingly” 
multiplied the proceedings.222  The Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of 
sanctions, holding that “[i]f Congress had intended to permit federal courts 
to impose sanctions against law firms, it would have included an express 
authorization to do so in the statute.”223 
4.  The Majority’s Allegedly Unpersuasive Arguments 
The minority circuits have also noted that the majority circuits’ analyses 
lack sufficient support to conclude that § 1927 reaches law firms.224  In 
Claiborne, the Seventh Circuit posited that, although the Eleventh Circuit has 
upheld § 1927 sanctions against a law firm,225 it offered no plausible reason 
for including law firms among persons or entities that may be sanctioned 
under the statutory scheme.226  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has stated that 
“[t]he Eleventh Circuit seemingly conflated the sanctioning powers in 
 
 213. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 214. Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 723 (citing Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 
120, 121 (1989)). 
 215. See id.  Rule 11 was not amended through legislation.  Whether a sanctions authority 
has been amended by judicial or legislative action, however, is unimportant because each has 
the same result. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 216. Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 723. 
 217. Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 218. Id. at 1292. 
 219. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (prescribing the general rules of pleading in federal court). 
 220. Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1292. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See, e.g., Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Kaass 
Law, 799 F.3d at 1294–95.  
 225. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 226. Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 722–23 (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s misapplication of 
Roadway Express to support its conclusion, even though that case did not involve law firm 
liability under § 1927 but, rather, liability under the court’s inherent power to sanction). 
2017] AFFIRMING FIRM SANCTIONS 287 
[§ 1927 and Rule 11] when it upheld sanctions against lead counsel and his 
law firm.”227  The minority circuits have also criticized228 decisions of the 
District of Columbia229 and Third Circuits,230 both of which have 
implicitly231 affirmed sanctions against law firms without any discussion of 
the legal issue232 this Note contemplates. 
The Ninth Circuit has called into question the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Enmon233 by reasoning that the Second Circuit supported its decision to 
uphold sanctions against a law firm on the courts’ inherent power to sanction 
rather than the text of § 1927.234  The Ninth Circuit went on to state that the 
Second Circuit’s conclusion that the statutory language allows the imposition 
of sanctions on law firms235 lacks legal merit because the court overlooked 
citations to Pavelic and Claiborne in the appellant’s brief and failed to 
address those cases in its decision.236  Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has 
noted237 that in Blue v. United States Department of the Army238 the Fourth 
Circuit expressed doubt as to whether law firms may be sanctioned under § 
1927,239 even though the circuit court did not resolve the issue in that 
matter.240 
III.  RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The circuit courts’ inconsistent interpretations of § 1927 and the authority 
to impose sanctions on law firms demonstrate the need for a clear resolution.  
Federal law should be administered consistently within the federal system,241 
and courts should uniformly interpret the statute to provide predictability and 
consistency.242  Part III.A analyzes the specific problems plaguing both the 
majority and minority approaches of the circuit courts.243  Part III.B affords 
two solutions to these problems and describes the implications of each. 
 
 227. Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1294.  
 228. Id.; see also Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 722. 
 229. See, e.g., LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 230. See, e.g., Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 231. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 232. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (identifying § 1927’s application to law firm 
conduct as a matter of law). 
 233. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 234. Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 235. Enmon, 675 F.3d at 148. 
 236. Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1295; see also Brief for Appellant at 49, Enmon, 675 F.3d 138 
(No. 10-2811-cv), 2010 WL 4715535. 
 237. Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 238. 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 239. Id. at 549 (“[W]e are doubtful that [§ 1927 and other sanctions authorities] support 
sanctions against an entire firm rather than against the individual lawyers who acted 
improperly.”). 
 240. Id.  It should be noted, however, that Blue was decided prior to the adoption of the 
1993 amendments to Rule 11, which expressly authorized sanctions against law firms. See 
supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
 241. See COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., supra note 104, at 
206–07. 
 242. Id. at 207. 
 243. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
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A.  Problems Underlying Each Approach 
Part III.A.1 argues that the majority circuits’ approach244 is questionable 
because it lacks express foundation and expands judicial boundaries.  
Although grounded in sound policy, this approach interprets § 1927 broadly 
due to the statute’s text and legislative history.  Part III.A.2 argues that 
minority circuits’ analysis245 fails to recognize and meet the statute’s 
purpose.  The text and history of § 1927 justify the minority’s conclusion, but 
that conclusion does not account for important and reasonable policy 
considerations. 
1.  Section 1927’s Authority to Sanction:  
Lack of Evidentiary and Textual Support 
Unambiguous language is the majority approach’s worst enemy.246  The 
statute clearly defines those who fall within the statute’s reach:  “[a]ny 
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United 
States.”247  Furthermore, when a statute’s ambiguity is not in question—that 
is, when the legislature has clearly spoken—courts should adhere to 
Congress’s approved standards.248 
Congress’s lack of statutory amendment to date249 also calls into question 
the majority’s theoretical attempt at judicial activism.250  When the 
imposition of sanctions on a law firm under pre-1993 Rule 11 was challenged 
in Pavelic, the Supreme Court relied on the text of the federal rule to conclude 
a lack of judicial authority.251  The Court held that the plain language of Rule 
11 did not permit the remedy imposed by the lower court and thus declined 
to uphold the sanctions.252  After Pavelic, Rule 11 was quickly amended to 
allow such authority.253 
In addition, the majority’s attempts to rely on textual arguments to support 
the imposition of sanctions against law firms do not hold much water.254  In 
Brignoli, a district court’s conclusion that law firms may “naturally” be 
considered “other person[s] admitted to conduct cases” so as to fall within 
the statute’s reach255 seemingly signifies flawed logic.  The text of the statute 
 
 244. See supra Part II.A. 
 245. See supra Part II.B. 
 246. See supra notes 184–202 and accompanying text. 
 247. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 251. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 254. See generally supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.  
 255. See, e.g., Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 100, 101–02 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that the phrase “those entities who ‘conduct cases’” connotes “a 
statutory class or category into which law firms naturally fall”).  The Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel of the First Circuit has also relied on Brignoli’s textual reasoning. See Castellanos Grp. 
Law Firm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc.), 545 B.R. 401, 420–
21 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
2017] AFFIRMING FIRM SANCTIONS 289 
expressly allows for sanctions against “[a]ny attorney or other person 
admitted to conduct cases in any court.”256  Words preceded or surrounded 
by others in the same statutory phrase “are liable to be affected by other 
words with which they are associated.”257  This canon of statutory 
construction258 is widely accepted and supports consistency in meaning.259  
The plain language of § 1927 implies an understanding that statutory 
sanctions may be imposed only against individuals,260 since the term “other 
person” seems to be modified by “[a]ny attorney,”261 which precedes it in the 
statutory scheme.  It follows, therefore, that only individuals—not law 
firms—may be admitted to conduct cases, since only individual lawyers or 
other representatives may be admitted or allowed to practice before the 
courts.262  The text of § 1927 cuts against the grain of the majority’s view.263 
a.  Sacrificing Judicial Boundaries for Efficiency 
Another issue that belies the majority approach is its expansion of the 
scope of § 1927.264  The majority circuits have relied on the statute as the 
basis on which to impose sanctions against law firms, presumably expanding 
the scope of the legislative text.  Such a finding is ideal from an efficiency 
standpoint, since the federal judiciary has previously concluded that law 
firms should be sanctionable as entities in and of themselves for certain 
conduct.265  However, federal courts already have the authority to sanction 
law firms pursuant to the courts’ inherent authority to sanction under 
common law.266  This authority requires a finding of subjective bad faith, but 
the text of § 1927 is silent on the matter.267  Thus, it might be argued that the 
 
 256. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 257. RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 138–39 (John Bell & George Angle eds., 
3d ed. 1995) (discussing noscitur a sociis as a popular canon of statutory construction). 
 258. See Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A canon of 
construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase . . . should be determined 
by the words immediately surrounding it”). 
 259. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 344 n.91 (1990) (noting that the “maxim” of 
noscitur a sociis suggests “light may be shed on the meaning of statutory words by the words 
surrounding them”). 
 260. See supra notes 163–78 and accompanying text. 
 261. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (identifying those who may be sanctioned as “[a]ny 
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any 
Territory thereof”). 
 262. See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005); see also supra Part 
II.B.1.  In Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 723, the Seventh Circuit also acknowledged that certain 
nonattorneys may “conduct cases” before the courts but noted that such authority may be 
vested only in individuals, not entities. 
 263. See generally supra Part II.A. 
 264. See generally supra Part II.A. 
 265. This is precisely the issue that brought about the 1993 amendments to Rule 11. See 
generally supra Part I.B. 
 266. See generally supra Part I.C. 
 267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012); see also supra Part I.A; supra notes 84, 91 and 
accompanying text. 
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majority has eliminated a finding of bad faith which would otherwise be 
required to sanction law firms using inherent authority.268 
Such judicial undertakings have been criticized and presumably ought to 
be avoided as it is widely held that courts should not expand the scope of 
statutory text absent express authority to do so.269  Where Congress has 
spoken and statutory text warrants one conclusion, nonlegislative entities, 
including the judiciary, should construe the words of the statute in conformity 
with explicit congressional intent.270  Thus, although uniformity is 
heightened under the majority view,271 judicial and legislative boundaries are 
sacrificed for the sake of efficiency.272 
b.  Foundational Nonexistence 
The majority approach is plagued by the same issues that affected Rule 
11.273  Rule 11 did not allow for sanctions to be imposed against law firms 
prior to its amendment in 1993.274  When the Supreme Court analyzed the 
legality of sanctions imposed against a law firm in Pavelic, it relied on the 
express language of the rule to denounce such authority.275  The Court noted 
that the specific text of Rule 11 requires a court to “impose upon the 
person . . . an appropriate sanction” for certain litigation conduct.276  It 
construed “person” to mean an individual and only an individual.277  The 
Court’s decision in Pavelic prompted the Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to amend Rule 11, and Congress acquiesced to its 
new construction and reach.278 
 
 268. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that, pursuant 
to the inherent authority, courts “may assess attorney’s fees against litigants, counsel, and law 
firms who willfully abuse [the] judicial process by conduct tantamount to bad faith”); see also 
supra Part I.C.  It should be noted, however, that some circuit courts have concluded that bad 
faith has both an objective and subjective meaning under § 1927, and thus reckless and 
intentional conduct are equally actionable under the statutory scheme. See In re TCI, Ltd., 769 
F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Mach v. Will Cty. Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir. 
2009) (stating that, within the context of § 1927, bad faith “has both a subjective and objective 
meaning” and that “reckless and intentional conduct [should be treated] equally”).  
Furthermore, the Chambers Court included “vexatious” conduct in its description of certain 
behavior that constitutes bad faith. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991). 
 269. Cf. Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that 
“only Congress, not the courts, may expand the scope . . . beyond the exact words of [a] 
statute”); Grider v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is up to 
Congress, and not the courts, to expand the scope of [statutes].” (citation omitted)); Schofield 
v. First Commodity Corp. of Bos., 793 F.2d 28, 31 n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that “it is up 
to Congress, and not the courts, to expand the scope of [a] statute”). 
 270. See generally FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 271. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 264–70 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126–27 (1989); see also 
supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 276. Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 123 (emphasis added). 
 277. Id. at 123–25. 
 278. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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To date, the Supreme Court has not had an occasion to evaluate the scope 
of § 1927 in this context.  Although the issue surrounding Rule 11 in Pavelic 
did not pertain to the construction of a federal statute,279 it is illustrative of 
the statute’s scope.  In Pavelic, the Court held eight-to-one that the express 
language of the rule barred courts from sanctioning anyone other than parties 
and individual representatives.280  In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
construed the meaning of “person” as a signal of the drafters’ intent to allow 
sanctions to be imposed on any “juridical person,” including law firms,281 
but that argument and construction did not persuade a majority of the Court, 
let alone any other Justice. 
Additionally, the history of § 1927’s enactment, reenactment, and 
amendments demonstrates a lack of foundational support for the majority 
rule.282  This historical backdrop serves as support for the minority 
approach283 and the belief that law firms may be sanctioned under statutory 
schemes only when Congress expressly affirms such authority.284 
2.  Section 1927’s Limitations:  
Textually Certain, Yet Not Necessarily True 
Just as the majority block’s analysis has its failures, so too does the 
minority approach.  The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits’ foci in 
determining the application and scope of § 1927 is grounded in textual 
scrutiny.285  Their determination that the text of the statute disallows the 
imposition of sanctions against nonindividuals is bolstered by the doctrines 
of expressio unius,286 noscitur a sociis,287 and the plain meaning rule.288  
Such inquiries and analyses, however, consistently fail to consider the policy 
behind § 1927 and the mischief the statute seeks to address.289  A narrow, 
textual focus presupposes alternative concerns and is far less pragmatic as a 
basis for interpretation.290  The minority view is seemingly blind to the 
 
 279. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
 280. Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 126–27. 
 281. Id. at 128–29 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 282. See generally supra Part I.A; see also supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text. 
 283. See generally supra Part II.B. 
 284. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 285. See generally supra Part II.B.1. 
 286. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text. 
 288. The plain meaning rule stems from the idea that “courts are subordinate policymakers, 
‘honest agents’ who implement the directives of the legislature.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 404 (1990).  Thus, the judiciary is 
obligated to analyze and interpret legislative enactments pursuant to their plain meanings, 
“without reference to personal desires or individual conceptions of justice.” Id. (quoting Lon 
L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 633 (1949)). 
 289. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 290. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 249 (2d ed. 2006).  When a theory of statutory interpretation is based on a 
single foundation, any subsequent analysis tends to ignore “the pragmatic insight that our 
intellectual framework is not single-minded” because such pragmatism fashions a 
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purposivist approach of the majority circuits291 and consequently does not 
address the issue in full, thus missing the mark in addressing the dispute in 
its entirety. 
a.  Legislative Focus:  Intentionalism and the Mischief Rule 
The minority circuits’ reliance on text and syntax does not account for the 
canons of statutory interpretation at the judiciary’s disposal.292  Mere textual 
evaluations overlook one of the oldest293 and still-relevant tools of statutory 
interpretation:  the mischief rule.  This doctrine allows courts to identify the 
“mischief and defect” that an enactment was intended to remedy and utilize 
the enactment to meet the mischief identified.294  Implementation of the 
mischief rule in statutory analysis necessarily provokes an invitation to 
examine the intent of a given statutory scheme beyond its text.295  The 
majority circuits have effectively utilized this canon of construction by 
recognizing an authority under § 1927 to impose sanctions against law firms 
when they deem such sanctions appropriate.296  The minority block has 
conversely ignored such analysis. 
The mischief rule and the majority’s purposivist approach297 afford § 1927 
meaning.  The principal inquiry which formed the basis for the statute’s 
enactment was “to inquire what [l]egislative provision is necessary to prevent 
multiplicity of suits or processes, where a single suit or process might 
suffice.”298  The causes for such congressional inquiry were rising litigation 
costs, delays, and other abuses of the judicial process.299  Attorneys, of 
course, may be responsible for such conduct, and therefore may be 
sanctioned for conduct that meets the mischief that § 1927 addresses.  The 
minority coalition, however, consistently holds that represented parties and 
attorneys’ employers cannot be responsible for such conduct.300 
It is practical to prohibit § 1927 sanctions against a nonattorney party for 
behavior that would multiply proceedings in the federal courts.  For one, 
parties are normally unsophisticated in the law, and courts ordinarily afford 
 
 291. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 292. Cf. Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 17 F.3d 616, 
631 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that grammatical rules are not the only resources available to courts 
when interpreting legislative enactments). 
 293. The mischief rule was expounded in the sixteenth century by Lord Coke. Heydon’s 
Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638; see also Elliot Coal, 17 F.3d at 631. 
 294. See Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 638; see also Elliot Coal, 17 F.3d at 631; supra 
notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
 295. Cf. Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 638–39. 
 296. See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2012); see 
also Castellanos Grp. Law Firm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re MJS Las Croabas Props., 
Inc.), 545 B.R. 401, 419–22 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
 297. See generally supra Part II.A.1. 
 298. See 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813); see also JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 20. 
 299. See Janet Eve Josselyn, Note, The Song of the Sirens—Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1927, 31 B.C. L. REV. 477, 477–78 (1990); see also supra notes 29–32 and 
accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 165–69, 173–78 and accompanying text. 
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relaxed requirements to pro se litigants.301  Where a party is represented by 
an attorney employed by a law firm, however, the attorney represents the 
client while also fulfilling her duties and obligations owed to her employer—
the firm.  Allowing courts to impose sanctions under § 1927 against both 
individual attorneys and law firms that employ them protects the integrity of 
the statute without restricting its reach.302  Such a determination would meet 
the misconduct § 1927 was enacted to redress and account for the increased 
prevalence of the law firm.303 
In addition, a major gap in the minority’s reliance on Pavelic is the 
aftermath of the Court’s decision to reverse sanctions against a law firm 
under the preamendment Rule 11.304  Congress did not veto the Advisory 
Committee’s decision to amend Rule 11 to provide courts the authority to 
sanction firms.305  Similarly, Congress did not contest amended Rule 11’s 
mandate of vicarious liability of law firms for any sanctions imposed against 
attorneys under their employ.306  Furthermore, the minority circuits ignore 
the Advisory Committee’s comments to the amended rule, which state it is 
appropriate for a law firm to be jointly responsible for its employees’ conduct 
under “established principles of agency.”307  In sum, the minority circuits do 
not account for these circumstantial factors and supporting policy 
justifications in their analyses of § 1927. 
b.  Lack of Public Policy Support for the Minority View 
The minority circuits’ approach lacks public policy justifications.308  In 
Claiborne, the Seventh Circuit ordered the plaintiff’s attorney to pay the 
defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs exceeding $100,000, but declined to 
affirm an award of sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm, even 
though the lower court determined that the firm acted in bad faith.309  
Similarly, in Kaass Law, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a defendant had to 
pay its own legal fees in defense of meritless litigation with no basis in law 
or fact.310  Although the minority’s textual arguments adhere to one form of 
statutory interpretation,311 those arguments often do not lend themselves to 
equitable outcomes.312 
 
 301. See 1 STEPHEN E. ARTHUR & ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK CIVIL 
§ 10:20 (2012). 
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 304. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989).  
 305. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra notes 289–91 and accompanying text. 
 309. See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–24 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 310. See Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 311. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 290, at 231–45 (describing the textualist theory of 
statutory interpretation). 
 312. See, e.g., Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 724. 
294 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
Congress enacted what has become § 1927 more than 200 years ago.313  In 
the early 1800s, attorneys were predominantly solo practitioners, and law 
partnerships were uncommon.314  The earliest form of the statute called for 
the imposition of sanctions, where appropriate, upon attorneys, proctors, or 
others conducting cases before the federal courts.315  Since the earliest 
drafters could not foresee problems regarding vicarious or direct liability on 
attorneys’ employers, such liability was likely not needed at the time.316  
Over time, however, the legal landscape has been transformed.317 
The above explanation does not completely reconcile the inconsistency.  
The statute was last amended in 1980, and Congress did not change its 
language to include law firms.318  Although this notion supports the 
minority’s viewpoint, it still does not account for the exponential growth of 
the legal field and the rise of law firm practice since the mid-1980s.319  After 
all, the 1980 amendments were part of an overall effort to expedite and reduce 
the costs associated with antitrust litigation.320  The focus, when the 
amendments were considered, was attorney dilatory practices.321  Congress 
called for a change to the statute to increase the costs that may be available 
to victims of litigation misconduct.322  At the time, Congress did not 
contemplate whether law firms should be held either directly or vicariously 
liable for such misconduct.323 
Lack of express deliberation, however, does not connote express 
declination.  As recently as the 1980s, law firms were not as abundant, large, 
or prevalent as they are today.324  When legislating in 1980, Congress likely 
did not comprehend this issue and the policy concerns it raises, the effects of 
which the majority approach takes into account.325 
B.  The Call for Consistency:  Statutory and Judicial Fixes 
The ideal resolution of the split at issue in this Note is a congressional 
amendment.  Part III.B.1 calls for a reconfiguration of § 1927 to expressly 
include law firms within its scope. 
If a statutory amendment is unfeasible, however, the federal judiciary may 
still effectuate redress through its inherent authority to sanction.326  Part 
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 315. See supra notes 28, 186 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 142–61 and accompanying text.  
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 322. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text; see also BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., 
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III.B.2 argues this approach would establish uniform treatment of attorneys 
practicing in the federal system and curb differential interpretation across 
jurisdictions, since the conduct that § 1927 seeks to remedy is actionable 
pursuant to the inherent authority.327 
1.  Congressional Involvement and Amendment 
Based on federal judicial analyses328 and the history and development of 
§ 1927,329 it is evident that the legislation is textually unambiguous.330  
Section 1927 allows for sanctions to be imposed only against “[a]ny attorney 
or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United 
States.”331  Such a conclusion, however, would upset the purpose of the 
statute in today’s legal sphere.  Attorneys must be protected from the 
heightened expectations of performance that the modern legal landscape 
demands,332 just as parties must be protected from dilatory and vexatious 
litigation conduct.333  Public policy as well as increasing law firm growth334 
and mergers335 exemplify a need for change and accountability.  Such 
recognition would allow the federal judiciary to utilize § 1927 to meet 
original congressional intent and the statute’s purpose.  Congress must amend 
§ 1927 to account for this void and give the statute teeth.336 
2.  Judicial Uniformity with Limited Reach 
Unless and until Congress amends § 1927, federal courts must be willing 
to uniformly adopt an interpretation of the statute that promotes its policy 
objectives.  This can be done through use of the federal courts’ inherent 
authority to sanction. 
This approach is less desirable than congressional amendment because the 
inherent authority ought to be predicated on a finding of subjective bad 
faith.337  Section 1927 makes no mention of a bad faith requirement, and 
indeed some circuits do not require such a finding to impose sanctions under 
the statute.338  In discussing the scope of the federal judiciary’s inherent 
authority to impose sanctions, the Court concluded that “a court may assess 
[sanctions] when a party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.’”339  Thus, it seems that the inherent authority to sanction 
may very well be invoked to meet the conduct that § 1927 seeks to remedy—
 
 327. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra Parts II.A and II.B. 
 329. See supra Part I.A. 
 330. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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unreasonable and vexatious litigation behavior.340  If § 1927 sanctions are 
used to deter the misconduct acknowledged in the statute, then a finding of 
bad faith would normally necessitate their imposition.341 
CONCLUSION 
Several circuits have analyzed, interpreted, and applied § 1927 to provide 
its intended remedy.  Some, though, have failed to do so, thus impairing the 
effectiveness of the statute while perpetuating marked inconsistencies.  This 
Note proposes an amendment to § 1927 that gives the statute unquestionable 
and proper application.342  Such an amendment would provide parties with 
ample redress and protection against unreasonable litigation conduct, the 
potential for which has greatly increased in the modern legal landscape.  
Through adoption of this proposal, the federal circuits may move one step 
closer to a more uniform and efficient administration of justice. 
  
 
 340. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 341. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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APPENDIX 
PROPOSED 28 U.S.C. § 1927: 
LIABILITY FOR EXCESSIVE COSTS 
 
(a) Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court 
of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the 
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, 
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct; 
 
(b) If the court requires any attorney or other person admitted to conduct 
cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof as set 
forth in subsection (a) to satisfy personally any excess costs, 
expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred, the court may also 
hold the employer or partnership of the attorney or other person 
jointly liable to satisfy the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees 
reasonably incurred; 
 
(c) A court may require an employer or partnership of any attorney or 
other person as set forth in subsection (a) who so multiplies the 
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously to satisfy any 
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred due 
to such conduct even if the court does not also require the individual 
attorney or person to satisfy the excess costs, expenses, and 
attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred. 
